Bonjour à tous
Un fil pour un retour d'expérience intéressant sur cet accident
http://www.ainonline.com/news/single-news-page/article/poor-tire-mx-late-reject-caused-2008-learjet-60-crash/
Le lien NTSB :
http://ntsb.gov/Publictn/2010/AAR1002.htm
Si je comprends bien tout, sur un avion dûment certifié par la FAA, il se peut se produire en cas de dommage dans les puits de roues une commande intempestive d'augmentation de la poussée...
La sécurité e aéronautique reste très largement l'affaire de tout les acteurs et une affaire toujours remise en cause. La vérité d'un jour n'est pas la vérité du lendemain... les certifications mises au point au début de l'ère des jets peuvent ne plus être satisfaisantes aujourd'hui
Bonne lecture
Un fil pour un retour d'expérience intéressant sur cet accident
http://www.ainonline.com/news/single-news-page/article/poor-tire-mx-late-reject-caused-2008-learjet-60-crash/
During a public hearing today, the NTSB issued the probable cause and 14 new recommendations related to the Learjet 60 overrun accident in Columbia, S.C., on Sept. 19, 2008. The captain, first officer and two passengers were killed in the crash; two other passengers were seriously injured. According to the Safety Board, the probable cause of this accident was the operator’s “inadequate” maintenance of the Learjet 60’s tires, resulting in multiple tire failures during the takeoff roll due to severe underinflation, as well as the captain executing a rejected takeoff after V1, “which was inconsistent with her training and standard operating procedures.” Contributing factors listed by the NTSB include “deficiencies” in the design and FAA certification of the Learjet 60’s thrust reverser system, which permitted the failure of critical systems in the wheel well area to result in uncommanded forward thrust that increased the severity of the accident; Learjet’s and the FAA’s failure to detect and correct the thrust reverser and wheel well design deficiencies after a 2001 uncommanded forward thrust accident; inadequate industry training standards for flight crews in tire-failure scenarios; and the flight crew’s “poor crew resource management.” The NTSB also issued 14 new recommendations, many related to tire maintenance and aircraft certification (see tomorrow’s issue of AINmxReports for more). Other recommendations pertain to pilot training, qualification and duties, including more realistic simulator training of tire-failure scenarios and other non-engine-related events at, near or after V1; requiring Part 135 pilots to have a minimum time in type and minimum operating experience, not just a type rating; and allowing pilots to perform tire pressure checks.
Le lien NTSB :
http://ntsb.gov/Publictn/2010/AAR1002.htm
Si je comprends bien tout, sur un avion dûment certifié par la FAA, il se peut se produire en cas de dommage dans les puits de roues une commande intempestive d'augmentation de la poussée...
Identify the deficiencies in Learjet’s system safety analyses, both for the original Learjet 60 design and for the modifications after the 2001 accident, that failed to properly address the thrust reverser system design flaws related to this accident, and require Learjet to perform a system safety assessment in accordance with 14 Code of Federal Regulations 25.1309 for all other systems that also rely on air-ground signal integrity and ensure that hazards resulting from a loss of signal integrity are appropriately mitigated to fully comply with this regulation.
La sécurité e aéronautique reste très largement l'affaire de tout les acteurs et une affaire toujours remise en cause. La vérité d'un jour n'est pas la vérité du lendemain... les certifications mises au point au début de l'ère des jets peuvent ne plus être satisfaisantes aujourd'hui
Bonne lecture