Par deux liens
1 de flightglobal : http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/opinion-why-airbus-still-has-a-widebody-race-to-run-404470/, non signé mais c'est flight
2 de leeham : http://leehamnews.com/2014/10/06/derivative-airplanes-some-good-some-not-part-1/
Je tire l'extrait du second
At Airbus, the company was sorely hurt by the development costs and delays of the A380 and military A400M. The cash squeeze, in our view, forced Airbus into at first a band-aid response to the 787 and expensive redesigns of the A350 until it settled on the three-member family of the XWB, the -800/900/1000. The -800 was the response to the 787-9; the -900 and -1000 took on the 777-200 and 300ER. The 787-8 went unchallenged, technologically speaking, leaving this battle to the A330, which for clarity we will call the A330 Classic.
Any fair assessment concludes that Airbus fumbled the ball, though it was a fumble induced by the A380 and A400M issues. Trying to cover two competitors, the 787 and the 777, with one family simply wasn’t a strategy that many thought would work. While Airbus was making the argument that the 787 carried too few passengers in an aviation world that was increasing in size, thus justifying the larger A350-800, its A350-1000 was smaller that the 777-300ER it was designed to compete with. This would come back to haunt Airbus in the coming years.
As time passed, it became clear the -800 wasn’t the right solution. Aircraft economics just weren’t good enough. The airplane cost about as much to operate as the larger -900 but it carried fewer passengers. Airlines were beginning to upgauge to the -900 and, in a few cases, the -1000, in part because Airbus had limited resources and were concentrating them on the -900 and -1000. It was clear the -800 had limited appeal and would be better off dropped. But what to do to cover the 787-8 and 787-9 markets? We’ll talk about this in Part 2.
The -1000 had its own issues. the original intent was to have full commonality between the family members, including the all-important (and very expensive) engines. But the performance was proving to fall short as analysis progressed. Airbus and engine maker Rolls-Royce soon tweaked the airplane, but in doing so angered customers because some of the critical engine commonality was lost. Emirates Airlines years later canceled its order for the A350 because it wasn’t the airplane it contracted for, said president Tim Clark.
After Boeing launched the 777-9, which carries an advertised 407 passengers to the -1000’s advertised 369, Airbus is faced with having too-small an airplane against the 777. The company is working to close the gap.
La gamme d'airbus en 2020 : A330-800 / A330-900 / A350-900 / A350-1000/A380-800 fait elle le poids face à celle de Boeing : 787-8, 787-9, 787-10, 777-8, 777-9
A priori sur le plan technique et marketing, c'est le débat du moment.
Les opinions de Scott Hamilton sont en général assez neutre et bonnes
Dans le même temps, les analystes financiers semblent devenir soucieux du retour sur investissement chez Boeing :
There’s the very real chance that this rate hike announcement might just be an effort to promote investor confidence. Boeing’s defense side is under heavy pressure. The profitable 777 twin aisle, also at record production levels, is set to decline in the next few years as customers wait for the 777X in the next decade. The 787 is a long way from turning cash positive. Thus, emphasizing 737 rate increases is one of the few credible ways Boeing can promise revenue growth, even if those rate increases are far from certain.