Boeing 787 (partie 1)

Connectivity solution in the works for 787?
By Jon Ostrower on October 23, 2009 11:17 AM | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBacks (0) |ShareThis
ShareCreateApture by flightbloggerWith all the discussion about getting 787 to fly, it is often forgotten that preparations have been well underway for years preparing the aircraft for airline service. However, as those preparations have stretched on two and a half years longer than expected, technology has continued to advance and changing trends inside the cabin have necessitated additional development to stay current.

My colleague, aircraft cabin connectivity expert, Mary Kirby, reports that Boeing is under pressure to select a connectivity solution for the 787.

"There is a lot of things that Boeing is trying to do to deliver it [the 787] on time but the overwhelming and loud feedback from the customer is 'you have to address this issue [in-flight connectivity] and you have to do it very quickly'," reveals David Bruner, vice-president, global communications services for Panasonic, which is supplying in-flight entertainment hardware for 787 customers in addition to Thales.

Boeing famously failed in its own attempt to create a sustainable business model for airborne high-speed Internet in the form of Ku-band satellite-based Connexion by Boeing, which was switched off in the commercial sector at the end of 2006.

With regard to the 787, Boeing confirms that it has not selected its in-flight connectivity solution. "We are in the process of an extensive trade study on this subject at this time," says a Boeing spokeswoman.

The airframer is exploring Ku offerings in addition to solutions that use Inmarsat's SwiftBroadband (SBB) aeronautical service over L-band satellites, according to IFEC industry players.

"I was amazed because I thought they'd say 'it's going to be two or three years and we'll look at it [connectivity] again', but they've rekindled the effort with us and other providers to ask - 'what is the right answer for this aircraft'," says Bruner.

In addition, some 787 customer have been invited back to the Dreamliner Gallery to see view new cabin offerings. Continental Airlines, for example, was invited back to Boeing to review its cabin selections, but says it made no changes to its plans for the 787s on order, says Brian Roland, engineering project manager for the airline.

No word yet on whether or not other airlines shifted their original choices for the cabins on their 787s. However, if you ask Mary Kirby, I'd bet she'd say that the connectivity selection could change this quite a bit.

Underlying the whole selection process is a shifting justification for the second line. As Boeing was accumulating orders at a stunning pace, the company entertained the idea of using a second assembly line to raise production rates to as high as 16 787s per month, beyond the 10 per month it had planned for the end of 2009. However, as the reality of the production troubles set in, the difficulty in ramping up made the second line imperative to get to the originally targeted 10 per month, now set for the end of 2013.

Boeing says why it picked South Carolina
At 2 p.m. Wedneday, Boeing made it official that it is picking North Charleston for a second 787 line.

"Boeing evaluated criteria that were designed to find the final assembly location within the company that would best support the 787 business plan as the program increases production rates. In addition to serving as a location for final assembly of 787 Dreamliners, the facility also will have the capability to support the testing and delivery of the airplanes," the company said in a statement.

"Establishing a second 787 assembly line in Charleston will expand our production capability to meet the market demand for the airplane," said Jim Albaugh, president and CEO of Boeing Commercial Airplanes. "This decision allows us to continue building on the synergies we have established in South Carolina with Boeing Charleston and Global Aeronautica," he said, adding that this move will strengthen the company's competitiveness and sustainability and help it grow for the long term.

"While we welcome the development of this expanded capability at Boeing Charleston, the Puget Sound region is the headquarters of Boeing Commercial Airplanes. Everett will continue to design and produce airplanes, including the 787, and there is tremendous opportunity for our current and future products here," Albaugh emphasized. "We remain committed to Puget Sound."

Until the second 787 assembly line is brought on line in North Charleston, Boeing will establish transitional surge capability at Everett to ensure the successful introduction of the 787-9, the first derivative model of the 787, Boeing said. When the second line in Charleston is up and operating, the surge capability in Everett will be phased out.

[Federal Register: October 14, 2009 (Volume 74, Number 197)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Page 52698-52702]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID-21]

=======================================================================
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 25

[Docket No. NM415; Notice No. 25-09-11-SC]


Special Conditions: Boeing Model 787-8 Airplane; Lightning
Protection of Fuel Tank Structure To Prevent Fuel Tank Vapor Ignition

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed special conditions.

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SUMMARY: This action proposes special conditions for the Boeing Model
787-8 airplane. This airplane will have novel or unusual design
features when compared to the state of technology envisioned in the
airworthiness standards for transport category airplanes. The Boeing
Model 787-8 airplane will incorporate a fuel tank nitrogen generation
system (NGS) that actively reduces flammability exposure within the
main fuel tanks significantly below that required by the fuel tank
flammability regulations. Among other benefits, this significantly
reduces the potential for fuel vapor ignition caused by lightning
strikes. The applicable airworthiness regulations do not contain
adequate or appropriate safety standards for this design feature. These
proposed special conditions contain the additional safety standards
that the Administrator considers necessary to establish a level of
safety equivalent to that established by the existing airworthiness
standards.

DATES: We must receive your comments by November 30, 2009.

ADDRESSES: You must mail two copies of your comments to: Federal
Aviation Administration, Transport Airplane Directorate, Attention:
Rules Docket (ANM-113), Docket No. NM415, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW.,
Renton, Washington 98057-3356. You may deliver two copies to the
Transport Airplane Directorate at the above address. You must mark your
comments: Docket No. NM415. You may inspect comments in the Rules
Docket weekdays, except Federal holidays, between 7:30 a.m. and 4 p.m.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mike Dostert, FAA, ANM-112, Transport
Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service, 1601 Lind Avenue,
SW., Renton, Washington 98057-3356; telephone (425) 227-2132; facsimile
(425) 227-1149.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

We invite interested persons to take part in this rulemaking by
sending written comments, data, or views. The most helpful comments
reference a specific portion of the special conditions, explain the
reason for any recommended change, and include supporting data. We ask
that you send us two copies of written comments.
We will file in the docket all comments we receive as well as a
report summarizing each substantive public contact with FAA personnel
concerning these proposed special conditions. You may inspect the
docket before and after the comment closing date. If you wish to review
the docket in person, go to the address in the ADDRESSES section of
this notice between 7:30 a.m. and 4 p.m., Monday through Friday, except
Federal holidays.
We will consider all comments we receive by the closing date for
comments. We will consider comments filed late if it is possible to do
so without incurring expense or delay. We may change the proposed
special conditions based on comments we receive.
If you want the FAA to acknowledge receipt of your comments on this
proposal, include with your comments a pre-addressed, stamped postcard
on which the docket number appears. We will stamp the date on the
postcard and mail it back to you.

Background

On March 28, 2003, The Boeing Company applied for an FAA type
certificate for its new Boeing Model 787-8 passenger airplane. The
Boeing Model 787-8 airplane will be a new design, two-engine turbo-jet
transport category airplane with a two-aisle cabin configuration. The
maximum takeoff weight will be 484,000 pounds, and it will carry a
maximum of 381 passengers.

Type Certification Basis

Under provisions of 14 CFR 21.17, Boeing must show that Boeing
Model 787-8 airplanes (hereafter referred to as ``the 787'') meet the
applicable provisions of 14 CFR part 25, as amended by Amendments 25-1
through 25-117, with three exceptions. Sections 25.809(a) and 25.812
will remain as amended by Amendment 25-115, and Sec. 25.981, which
will be as amended by Amendment 25-125 in accordance with 14 CFR 26.37.
If the Administrator finds that the applicable airworthiness
regulations (i.e., part 25) do not contain adequate or appropriate
safety standards for the 787 because of novel or unusual design
features, special conditions are prescribed under provisions of 14 CFR
21.16.
In addition to the applicable airworthiness regulations and special
conditions, the 787 must comply with the fuel vent and exhaust emission
requirements of 14 CFR part 34 and the noise certification requirements
of 14 CFR part 36. Finally, the FAA must also issue a finding of
regulatory adequacy under Sec. 611 of Public Law 92-574, the ``Noise
Control Act of 1972.''
Special conditions, as defined in 14 CFR 11.19, are issued in
accordance with Sec. 11.38 and become part of the type certification
basis in accordance with Sec. 21.17(a)(2).
Special conditions are initially applicable to the model for which
they are issued. Should the type certificate for that model be amended
later to include any other model that incorporates the same or similar
novel or unusual design features, the special conditions would also
apply to the other model under Sec. 21.101.

Novel or Unusual Design Features

The proposed 787 will have a fuel tank NGS that is intended to
control fuel tank flammability. This NGS is designed to provide a level
of performance that will reduce the warm day fleet average wing fuel
tank flammability significantly below the maximum wing fuel tank
flammability limits set in Sec. 25.981(b), as amended by Amendment 25-
125. This high level of wing fuel tank NGS performance is an unusual
design feature not envisioned at the

[[Page 52699]]

time the regulations in the proposed 787 certification basis were
promulgated.

Existing Regulations

The certification basis of the 787 includes Sec. 25.981, as
amended by Amendment 25-125, as required by Sec. 26.37. This amendment
includes the ignition prevention requirements in Sec. 25.981(a), as
amended by Amendment 25-102, and it includes specific limitations on
fuel tank flammability in Sec. 25.981(b) as amended by Amendment 25-
125. (Section 25.981(c) contains an alternative to meeting paragraph
(b)--vapor ignition mitigation--that is not applicable to the proposed
787 design.)

Ignition Source Prevention

Section 25.981(a)(3) requires applicants to show that an ignition
source in the fuel tank system could not result from any single
failure, from any single failure in combination with any latent failure
condition not shown to be extremely remote, or from any combination of
failures not shown to be extremely improbable. This requirement was
originally adopted in Amendment 25-102 and was based on the assumption
that fuel tanks are always flammable. This requirement defines three
types of scenarios that must be addressed in order to show compliance
with Sec. 25.981(a)(3). The first scenario is that any single failure,
regardless of the probability of occurrence of the failure, must not
cause an ignition source. The second scenario is that any single
failure, regardless of the probability of occurrence, in combination
with any latent failure condition not shown to be at least extremely
remote, must not cause an ignition source. The third scenario is that
any combination of failures not shown to be extremely improbable must
not cause an ignition source. Demonstration of compliance with this
requirement would typically require a structured, quantitative safety
analysis. Design areas that have any latent failure conditions
typically would be driven by these requirements to have multiple fault
tolerance, or ``triple redundancy.'' This means that ignition sources
are still prevented even after two independent failures.

Flammability Limits

Section 25.981(b) states that no fuel tank fleet average
flammability exposure may exceed 3 percent of the flammability exposure
evaluation time calculated using the method in part 25, Appendix N, or
the fleet average flammability of a fuel tank within the wing of the
airplane being evaluated, whichever is greater. If the wing is not a
conventional unheated aluminum wing, the analysis must be based on an
assumed equivalent construction conventional unheated aluminum wing. In
addition, for fuel tanks that are normally emptied during operation and
that have any part of the tank located within the fuselage contour, the
fleet average flammability for warm days (above 80[deg]F) must be
limited to 3 percent as calculated using the method in part 25,
Appendix M.

Application of Existing Regulations Inappropriate Due to Impracticality

Since the promulgation of Sec. 25.981(a)(3), as amended by
Amendment 25-102, the FAA has conducted certification projects in which
applicants found it impractical to meet the requirements of that
regulation for some areas of lightning protection for fuel tank
structure. Partial exemptions were issued for these projects. These
same difficulties exist for the 787 project.
The difficulty of designing multiple-fault-tolerant structure, and
the difficulty of detecting failures of hidden structural design
features in general, makes compliance with Sec. 25.981(a)(3) uniquely
challenging and impractical for certain aspects of the electrical
bonding of structural elements. Such bonding is needed to prevent
occurrence of fuel tank ignition sources from lightning strikes. The
effectiveness and fault tolerance of electrical bonding features for
structural joints and fasteners is partially dependent on design
features that cannot be effectively inspected or tested after assembly
without damaging the structure, joint, or fastener. Examples of such
features include a required interference fit between the shank of a
fastener and the hole in which the fastener is installed, metal foil or
mesh imbedded in composite material, a required clamping force provided
by a fastener to pull two structural parts together, and a required
faying surface bond between the flush surfaces of adjacent pieces of
structural material such as in a wing skin joint or a mounting bracket
installation. In addition, other features that can be physically
inspected or tested may be located within the fuel tanks, therefore, it
is not practical to inspect for failures of those features at short
intervals. Examples of such failures include separation or loosening of
cap seals over fastener ends and actual structural failures of internal
fasteners. This inability to practically detect failures of structural
design features critical to lightning protection results in any such
failures that occur remaining in place for a very long time, and
possibly for the remaining life of the airplane, prior to detection.
Accounting for such long failure latency periods in the system
safety analysis required by Sec. 25.981(a)(3) would require multiple
fault tolerance in the structural lightning protection design. As part
of the design development activity for the 787, Boeing has examined
possible design provisions to provide multiple fault tolerance in the
structural design to prevent ignition sources from occurring in the
event of lightning attachment to the airplane in critical locations.
Boeing has concluded from this examination that providing multiple
fault tolerance for some structural elements is not practical. Boeing
has also identified some areas of the proposed 787 design where it is
impractical to provide even single fault tolerance in the structural
design to prevent ignition sources from occurring in the event of
lightning attachment after a single failure. The FAA has reviewed this
examination with Boeing in detail and has agreed that providing fault
tolerance beyond that in the proposed 787 design for these areas would
be impractical.
As a result of the 787 and other certifications projects, the FAA
has now determined that compliance with Sec. 25.981(a)(3) is
impractical for some areas of lightning protection for fuel tank
structure, and that application of Sec. 25.981(a)(3) to those design
areas is therefore inappropriate. The FAA plans further rulemaking to
revise Sec. 25.981(a)(3). The FAA plans to issue special conditions or
exemptions, when appropriate, for certification projects in the
interim. This is discussed in FAA Memorandum ANM-112-08-002, Policy on
Issuance of Special Conditions and Exemptions Related to Lightning
Protection of Fuel Tank Structure, dated May 26, 2009.\\1\\
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\\1\\ The memorandum may be viewed at: http://www.airweb.faa.gov/
Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgPolicy.nsf/0/
12350AE62D393B7A862575C300709CA3?OpenDocument&Highlight=anm-112-08-
002.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Application of Existing Regulations Inappropriate Due to Compensating
Feature That Provides Equivalent Level of Safety

Section 25.981(b) sets specific standards for fuel tank
flammability as discussed above under ``Flammability Limits.'' Under
that regulation, the fleet average flammability exposure of wing main
tanks on the 787 may not exceed 3 percent of the flammability exposure
evaluation time calculated using the method in part 25, Appendix N, or
the fleet average flammability of a wing main tank within an equivalent

[[Page 52700]]

construction conventional unheated aluminum wing fuel tank, whichever
is greater. If it is assumed that a 787 equivalent conventional
unheated aluminum wing fuel tank would not exceed a fleet average
flammability time of 3 percent, the actual composite airplane wing fuel
tank design would be required to comply with the 3 percent fleet
average flammability standard. However, the proposed 787 design
includes a wing tank NGS that will also be shown to meet the
additional, more stringent warm day average flammability standard in
part 25, Appendix M, which is only required for normally emptied fuel
tanks with some part of the tank within the fuselage contour.
Since the proposed wing tank NGS on the 787 provides performance
that meets part 25, Appendix M, the FAA has determined that the risk
reduction provided by this additional performance will provide
compensation for some relief from the ignition prevention requirements
of Sec. 25.981(a)(3).
In determining the appropriate amount of relief from the ignition
prevention requirements of Sec. 25.981(a), the FAA considered the
original overall intent of Amendment 25-102, which was to ensure the
prevention of catastrophic events due to fuel tank vapor explosion. The
proposed special conditions are intended to achieve that objective
through a prescriptive requirement that fault tolerance (with respect
to the creation of an ignition source) be provided for all structural
lightning protection design features where providing such fault
tolerance is practical, and through a performance-based standard for
the risk due to any single failure vulnerability that exists in the
design. In addition, for any structural lightning protection design
features for which Boeing shows that providing fault tolerance is
impractical, the proposed special conditions would require Boeing to
show that a fuel tank vapor ignition event due to the summed risk of
all non-fault-tolerant design features is extremely improbable. Boeing
would be required to show that this safety objective is met by the
proposed design using a structured system safety assessment similar to
that currently used for demonstrating compliance with Sec. Sec. 25.901
and 25.1309.

Discussion of the Proposed Requirements

Given these novel design features, and the compliance challenges
noted earlier in this document, the FAA has determined that application
of Sec. 25.981(a)(3) is inappropriate in that it is neither practical
nor necessary to apply the ignition source prevention provisions of
Sec. 25.981(a)(3) to the specific fuel tank structural lightning
protection features of the 787. However, without the Sec. 25.981(a)(3)
provisions, the remaining applicable regulations in the 787
certification basis would be inadequate to set an appropriate standard
for fuel tank ignition prevention. Therefore, in accordance with
provisions of Sec. 21.16, the FAA is proposing that, instead of Sec.
25.981(a)(3), alternative fuel tank structural lighting protection
requirements be applied to fuel tank lightning protection features that
are integral to the airframe structure of the 787. These alternative
requirements are intended to provide the level of safety intended by
Sec. 25.981(a)(3), based on our recognition, as discussed above, that
a highly effective NGS for the fuel tanks makes it unnecessary to
assume that the fuel tank is always flammable. As discussed previously,
the assumption that the fuel tank is always flammable was part of the
basis for the ignition prevention requirements of Sec. 25.981(a)(3).
One resulting difference between these proposed special conditions
and the Sec. 25.981(a)(3) provisions they are meant to replace is the
outcome being prevented--fuel vapor ignition versus an ignition source.
These proposed special conditions acknowledge that the application of
fuel tank flammability performance standards will reduce fuel tank
flammability to an extent that it is appropriate to consider the
beneficial effects of flammability reduction when considering design
areas where it is impractical to comply with Sec. 25.981(a)(3).
One of the core requirements of the proposed special conditions is
a prescriptive requirement that structural lightning protection design
features must be fault tolerant. (An exception wherein Boeing can show
that providing fault tolerance is impractical, and associated
requirements, is discussed below.) The other core requirement is that
Boeing must show that the design, manufacturing processes, and
airworthiness limitations section of the instructions for continued
airworthiness include all practical measures to prevent, and detect and
correct, failures of structural lightning protection features due to
manufacturing variability, aging, wear, corrosion, and likely damage.
The FAA has determined that, if these core requirements are met, a fuel
tank vapor ignition event due to lightning is not anticipated to occur
in the life of the airplane fleet. This conclusion is based on the fact
that a critical lightning strike to any given airplane is itself a
remote event, and on the fact that fuel tanks must be shown to be
flammable for only a relatively small portion of the fleet operational
life.
For any non-fault-tolerant features proposed in the design, Boeing
must show that eliminating these features or making them fault tolerant
is impractical. The requirements and considerations for showing it is
impractical to provide fault tolerance are described in FAA Memorandum
ANM-112-08-002. This requirement is intended to minimize the number of
non-fault tolerant features in the design.
For areas of the design where Boeing shows that providing fault
tolerant structural lighting protection features is impractical, non-
fault-tolerant features will be allowed provided Boeing can show that a
fuel tank vapor ignition event due to the non-fault-tolerant features
is extremely improbable when the sum of probabilities of those events
due to all non-fault-tolerant features is considered. Boeing will be
required to submit a structured, quantitative assessment of fleet
average risk for a fuel tank vapor ignition event due to all non-fault-
tolerant design features included in the design. This will require
determination of the number of non-fault tolerant design features,
estimates of the probability of the failure of each non-fault-tolerant
design feature, and estimates of the exposure time for those failures.
This analysis must include failures due to manufacturing variability,
aging, wear, corrosion, and likely damage.
It is acceptable to consider the probability of fuel tank
flammability, the probability of a lightning strike to the airplane,
the probability of a lightning strike to specific zones of the airplane
(for example, Zone 2 behind the nacelle, but not a specific location or
feature), and a distribution of lightning strike amplitude in
performing the assessment provided the associated assumptions are
acceptable to the FAA. The analysis must account for any dependencies
among these factors, if they are used. The assessment must also account
for operation with inoperative features and systems, including any
proposed or anticipated dispatch relief. This risk assessment
requirement is intended to ensure that an acceptable level of safety is
provided given the non-fault-tolerant features in the proposed design.
Part 25, Appendix N, as adopted in Amendment 25-125, in conjunction
with these proposed special conditions, constitutes the standard for
how to determine flammability probability. In performing the safety
analysis required by these proposed special conditions,

[[Page 52701]]

relevant Sec. 25.981(a)(3) compliance guidance is still applicable.
Appropriate credit for the conditional probability of environmental or
operational conditions occurring is normally limited to those
provisions involving multiple failures, and this type of credit is not
normally allowed in evaluation of single failures. However, these
proposed special conditions would allow consideration of the
probability of occurrence of lightning attachment and flammable
conditions when assessing the probability of structural failures
resulting in a fuel tank vapor ignition event.
The FAA understands that lightning protection safety for airplane
structure is inherently different from lightning protection for
systems. We intend to apply these special conditions only to structural
lightning protection features of fuel systems. We do not intend to
apply the alternative standards used under these special conditions to
other areas of the airplane design evaluation.

Proposed Requirements Provide Equivalent Level of Safety

In recognition of the unusual design feature discussed above, and
the impracticality of requiring multiple fault tolerance for lightning
protection of certain aspects of fuel tank structure, the FAA has
determined that an equivalent level of safety to direct compliance with
Sec. 25.981(a)(3) will be achieved for the 787 by applying these
proposed requirements. The FAA considers that, instead of only
concentrating on fault tolerance for ignition source prevention,
significantly reducing fuel tank flammability exposure in addition to
preventing ignition sources is a better approach to lightning
protection for the fuel tank. In addition, the level of average fuel
tank flammability achieved by compliance with these special conditions
is low enough that it is not appropriate or accurate to assume in a
safety analysis that the fuel tanks may always be flammable.
Section 25.981(b), as amended by Amendment 25-125, sets limits on
the allowable fuel tank flammability for the 787. Paragraph 2(a) of
these proposed special conditions applies the more stringent standard
for warm day flammability performance applicable to normally emptied
tanks within the fuselage contour from Sec. 25.981(b) and part 25,
Appendix M, to the wing tanks of the 787.
Because of the more stringent fuel tank flammability requirements
in these special conditions, and because the flammability state of a
fuel tank is independent of the various failures of structural elements
that could lead to an ignition source in the event of lightning
attachment, the FAA has agreed that it is appropriate in this case to
allow treatment of flammability as an independent factor in the safety
analysis. The positive control of flammability and the lower
flammability that is required by these special conditions exceeds the
minimum requirements of Sec. 25.981(b). This offsets a reduction of
the stringent standard for ignition source prevention in Sec.
25.981(a)(3), which assumes that the fuel tank is flammable at all
times.
Given the stringent requirements for fuel tank flammability, the
fuel vapor ignition prevention and the ignition source prevention
requirements in these special conditions will prevent ``* * *
catastrophic failure * * * due to ignition of fuel or vapors.'', as
stated in Sec. 25.981(a). Thus, the overall level of safety achieved
by these special conditions is considered equivalent to that which
would be required by compliance with Sec. 25.981(a)(3) and (b).

Applicability

These proposed special conditions are applicable to the 787-8.
Should Boeing apply at a later date for a change to the type
certificate to include another model incorporating the same novel or
unusual design features, these proposed special conditions would apply
to that model as well.

Conclusion

This action affects only certain novel or unusual design features
of the 787. It is not a rule of general applicability.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 25

Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements.

The authority citation for these special conditions is as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701, 44702, 44704.

The Proposed Special Conditions

Accordingly, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) proposes the
following special conditions as part of the type certification basis
for The Boeing Model 787-8 airplane.

1. Definitions

Most of the terms used in Special Condition No. 2, Alternative Fuel
Tank Structural Lightning Protection Requirements, either have the
common dictionary meaning or are defined in AC 25.1309-1A, System
Design and Analysis, dated June 21, 1988.
The following definitions are the only terms intended to have a
specialized meaning when used in Special Condition No. 2.:
(a) Basic Airframe Structure. Includes design elements such as
structural members, structural joint features, and fastener systems
including airplane skins, ribs, spars, stringers, etc., and associated
fasteners, joints, coatings, and sealant. Basic airframe structure may
also include those structural elements that are expected to be removed
for maintenance, such as exterior fuel tank access panels and fairing
attachment features, provided maintenance errors that could compromise
associated lightning protection features would be evident upon an
exterior preflight inspection of the airplane and would be corrected
prior to flight.
(b) Permanent Systems Supporting Structure. Includes static,
permanently attached structural parts (such as brackets) that are used
to support system elements. It does not include any part intended to be
removed, or any joint intended to be separated, to maintain or replace
system elements or other parts, unless that part removal or joint
separation is accepted by the FAA as being extremely remote.
(c) Manufacturing Variability. Includes tolerances and variability
allowed by the design and production specifications as well as
anticipated errors or escapes from the manufacturing and inspection
processes.
(d) Extremely Remote. Conditions that are not anticipated to occur
to each airplane during its total life, but which may occur a few times
when considering the total operational life of all airplanes of one
type. Extremely remote conditions are those having an average
probability per flight hour on the order of 1 x 10-7 or
less, but greater than on the order of 1 x 10-9.
(e) Extremely Improbable. Conditions that are so unlikely that they
are not anticipated to occur during the entire operational life of all
airplanes of one type. Extremely improbable conditions are those having
an average probability per flight hour of the order of 1 x
10-9 or less.

2. Alternative Fuel Tank Structural Lightning Protection Requirements

For lightning protection features that are integral to fuel tank
basic airframe structure or permanent systems supporting structure, as
defined in Special Condition No. 1, Definitions, for which the Boeing
Company shows and the FAA finds compliance with Sec. 25.981(a)(3) to
be impractical, the following requirements may be applied

[[Page 52702]]

in lieu of the requirements of Sec. 25.981(a)(3):
(a) The Boeing Company must show that the airplane design meets the
requirements of part 25, Appendix M, as amended by Amendment 25-125,
for all fuel tanks installed on the airplane.
(b) The Boeing Company must show that the design includes at least
two independent, effective, and reliable lightning protection features
(or sets of features) such that fault tolerance to prevent lightning-
related ignition sources is provided for each area of the structural
design proposed to be shown compliant with these special conditions in
lieu of compliance with the requirements of Sec. 25.981(a)(3). Fault
tolerance is not required for any specific design feature if:
(1) for that feature, providing fault tolerance is shown to be
impractical, and
(2) fuel tank vapor ignition due to that feature and all other non-
fault-tolerant features, when their fuel tank vapor ignition event
probabilities are summed, is shown to be extremely improbable.
(c) The applicant must perform an analysis to show that the design,
manufacturing processes, and airworthiness limitations section of the
instructions for continued airworthiness include all practical measures
to prevent, and detect and correct, failures of structural lightning
protection features due to manufacturing variability, aging, wear,
corrosion, and likely damage.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on September 24, 2009.
Ali Bahrami,
Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification
Service.
[FR Doc. E9-24652 Filed 10-13-09; 8 am]

BILLING CODE 4910-13-P

Late December first flight target for 787
Posted by Guy Norris at 11/5/2009 1:24 PM CST

Boeing is pointing more and more to a late December first flight target for the 787, and definitely more than a month away as I suggested in my previous (admittedly late night) blog post. As the company points out, although the side-of-body modification is complete on ZA001, preparations for flight remain on hold until validation tests on static test airframe ZY997 are completed. Even then there’s more waiting to go through while Boeing and the FAA evaluate the results and confirm the design meets the required goals. Only at this point will ZA001, or ‘AP1’, go back into pre-flight – a roughly three week process.

So let’s look at what that means in terms of potential timing. Boeing isn’t saying too much about the details of the static testing schedule but, depending on how long the results take to be checked and confirmed, we could be looking at pre-flight activity (gauntlet tests) getting underway around the Thanksgiving holiday (Nov 26). If all went well that would shunt the first flight window to approximately the Dec 17-24 period. If more issues crop up the company still has the remaining week in December to achieve its target of flying by year-end. So is this a long-looked for chance for Boeing to finally celebrate the festive season with a first flight, or more likely a major slice of overtime for the Boeing flight test team? Either way there’s a busy December in store for Everett.

ZA001 wing fix complete, waits on 787 static test for late December first flight
By Jon Ostrower on November 10, 2009

The installation of the wing fix for the first 787 - ZA001 - is now complete, with program sources telling FlightBlogger that flight test schedules have readjusted to target late December for first flight just before Christmas.

Boeing declined to confirm the completion of the installation but says that "we are satisfied with the progress being made with the modifications and are on-track to fly before the end of the year."

As part of the Z18 program schedule, Boeing initially targeted late November for first flight, but the on going pace of engineering design, the availability of the machined fittings, and the installation of the wing fix has slid 787 first flight roughly a month.

The latest target holds 787 first flight within Boeing's latest revised target of flying by the close of 2009.

Sources also indicate that the wing fix is slated to undergo full-scale testing on the static airframe is currently slated for late-November. Once complete, Boeing engineers will study the results to validate the wing fix and clear ZA001 to begin its certification campaign.

Additionally, as a result of the completion, ZA001 restoration work is scheduled to begin today in Everett.

Restoration consists of a thorough cleaning, re-installation of systems and complete panel close out.

Once restoration is complete, what remains unknown is if ZA001 will stay in the paint hangar while ZY997 undergoes final validation or return to the flight line to re-start preparation for first flight.

WSJ details issue with Boeing 787 bolts
While Boeing engineers raced to fix a side-of-body issue that delayed first flight of the 787 Dreamliner this summer, they found another issue with the composite material in the plane's wings, according to a Wall Street Journal report.

They found that metal bolts, called freeze plugs, inside the wings of one of the six test airplanes had slightly damaged the surrounding material, causing delamination, or cracking, the Journal said, citing "internal company documents and a person familiar with the matter."

The damage was confined to a relatively small area, but engineers decided the plane couldn't fly until the problem was corrected, the Journal reported.

Responding to the story Friday, Boeing spokesman Jim Proulx said: "The issues identified in that story have been resolved." He said the 787 remains on track to fly this year.

The Journal quoted an unnamed Boeing official acknowledging that delamination occurred around the bolt holes, but saying that wouldn't affect the first flight or require a repair.

"The freeze plug process is a standard repair we perform on both metallic and composite structure," the official told the Journal. "We have extensive experience using these techniques. We have not seen any issues with these repairs that are inconsistent with our experience or the capability of these repair techniques."

Sounds like the resolution was deciding the delamination wasn't a problem.

Report: First Boeing 787 flight planned around Dec. 22
Boeing is planning first flight of its long-delayed 787 Dreamliner around Dec. 22, Dow Jones reported Thursday, citing "a person familiar with the situation."

"It is now scheduled to take to the sky on Dec. 22, give or take a couple of days," the person told Dow Jones Newswires. "I don't think this will change much."

A wing load test on the static test 787 in the 40-23 began at 4:30 PM today and was completed at 7:20 PM. Second test scheduled to begin at 8:00 PM.

Boeing took a key step toward getting its first 787 in the air after completing the static testing necessary to validate the side-of-body modification work performed last month (ATWOnline, Nov. 17). Full analysis of the results will not be concluded for about 10 days, it said. During the tests, the leading and trailing edges were subjected to their limit load of about 2.5 g. The 150% structural tests required for certification are planned for spring. The modification comprised installation of new fittings at 34 stringer locations in the joint where the wing attaches to the fuselage. It has been completed on the first two flight test aircraft and the static test airframe. The flight test aircraft, ZA001 and ZA002, are back on the flight line and it is expected that taxi and gauntlet tests will be conducted over the next two weeks as the Dec. 22 first flight approaches. According to sources in Everett, Boeing is considering flying the 787 and 747-8F on the same day.

Boeing aims for two 787s to fly by year-end



Boeing has set a new target date of Friday, Dec. 18th, for the 787's initial flight, and a second plane is set to take to the air just 10 days after the first, according to a person close to the new and much-delayed jet program.

By Dominic Gates

Seattle Times aerospace reporter



Related




The date for the 787 Dreamliner's first flight has inched closer, and Boeing hopes to fly not one but two 787s by year-end.
According to a person close to the jet program, Boeing has set a new target date of Friday, Dec. 18, for the initial flight — four days earlier than its previous plan.
And Dreamliner No. 2 is set to take to the air just 10 days after the first, the person said.
After more than two years of delays, excitement is growing among those working on the new airplane, who now anticipate a pre-Christmas flight and look forward to a New Year test-flight program that could erase the memory of 2009's embarrassing glitches.
The schedule's acceleration follows the successful retesting of the wing last week, which validated the fix for a structural flaw that caused a test failure last May and the consequent suspension of the planned June first flight.
That wing test was performed on an airplane inside the factory that is rigged up for structural-load testing, a plane that will never fly. The same fix for the wing-joint flaw has been installed on Dreamliners No. 1 and No. 2.
On Monday, Dreamliner No. 1 was moved to the fuel dock on Paine Field and the wings were filled with jet fuel.
Late on Tuesday evening, a test pilot restarted the jet's Rolls-Royce engines for the first time since the summer, sending copious clouds of white smoke billowing into the frigid night air.
Rolls-Royce spokesman Mark Thompson said that was the burning off of a film of oil that coated and protected the internal engine components during the months of disuse.
In the days ahead, the test pilots will run the engines constantly and test all the airplane systems running under the jet's own power. The tests will include simulated flight maneuvers.
Afterward, the airplane will move on to taxi tests on the ground, moving first at low speed and eventually at higher speeds approaching takeoff velocity — enough to lift the nose wheels just off the runway.
That high-speed taxi test should mark the eve of first flight.
When that long-postponed flight comes, the plan is to take off from Everett and land at Boeing Field some five hours later.

787 Countdown to first flight (resumed) Part 2
Posted by Guy Norris at 12/7/2009 10:14 AM CST

After a hectic weekend at Everett it seems as if all testing has so far gone to plan and that ZA001, the first 787, may soon be moving again under its own power. The aircraft currently remains at Stall 105 on the flight line, but sources indicate an all-hands 'safety walk' is expected to take place sometime today - generally taken as a good sign of imminent taxi testing.
For those interested in numbers, ZA001 has been fitted with Rolls-Royce Trent 1000's 10015 and 10016. The engines were maintained and given minor 'tweaks' during the six-month delay, but are substantially unchanged since June. The first major change will come next year when the upgraded 'Package B' engines are retrofittted to ZA004 later in the flight test program. ZA004 is currently assigned engine's 10023 and 21.
ZA002, which is due to commence systems ground tests today, is powered by 10012 and 10020, while ZA003 has 10018 and 10019. The first Package B engine, which is designed to bring the Trent-powered 787 to within 1% of spec, is set to enter tests in the UK later this week.

Boeing ups 787 weights, shrinks -9 wing

By [url=mailto://]Jon Ostrower[/url]

After more than two years of delays and speculation about the impact
of excess weight on the 787's carbonfibre airframe, Boeing has increased
the maximum take-off weight of all three variants and opted to shrink the wing of the 787-9 stretch.
The changes, disclosed in the December 2009 revision of the 787
Airport Compatibility document, identify the MTOW of the baseline 787-8
as 227,900kg (502,000lb) - up 8,400kg from the initially planned
219,500kg - while the 787-9's weight has grown by 2,270kg to 247,400kg.
The short-range 787-3 has seen a 5,000kg increase to 170,250kg. The
ranges of three 787 variants are not specified on this document.
Boeing says the new weights will be introduced beginning with
Airplane 20 and that the initial 219,500kg (484,000lb) MTOW for the
first 787-8s delivered remain in effect.
Boeing says the increase "will help us to meet the expectations of our customers".
Another notable development is a third revision to the 787-9's wing,
which started its design life with a common wing to the 787-8 at 60.1m
(197ft 3in) span. This was later increased to 61.9m, then as high as
63.4m, but has now shrunk back to the same dimensions as the 787-8.
Programme sources tell ATI and Flightglobal that the decision to
decrease the size of the 787-9 wing, which was made in May, was driven
by favourable findings on the capability of the 787-8 wing during tests
of the break trial of the half-span "-18" test wingbox, and the early
static tests.
At last month's Dubai air show, Ethiopian Airlines
chief executive Girma Wake said Boeing was trying to "come up with
various solutions" to meet contractual range, payload and fuel
consumption targets for the 787-9.
Boeing says that keeping the 787-9 wing the same size as the 787-8
is the "best choice to meet our objectives".
The use of the 787-8 gauge wing on the 787-9 is expected to yield
significant weight savings for the first Dreamliner derivative due for
entry into service with Air New Zealand
at the end of 2013. One observer estimates that a common span between
the two aircraft could save more than 1,800kg in empty weight, "which
would yield almost as much range as the loss in [aerodynamic]
efficiency costs".
Meanwhile, Boeing's first 787 test aircraft (ZA001) was last week
continuing round-the-clock testing to ensure its readiness for first
flight. The long-awaited milestone could come as early as next week.
Boeing pushed the Rolls-Royce Trent 1000-powered
Dreamliner forward into two to three days of closed-loop final gauntlet
simulations on 8 December. Those tests entailed operation of aircraft
systems to "fool" the aircraft into thinking it was flying.

http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2009/12/10/336055/boeing-ups-787-weights-shrinks-9-wing.html