AF447 Rio Paris

ans ce rapport, le BEA met en cause la formation des pilotes du vol AF447 et la manière dont ils ont réagi aux circonstances de vol de l'A330 qui s'est abîmé au large du Brésil le 1er juin 2009, faisant 228 morts.

"Airbus salue le dernier rapport intérimaire du BEA sur l'accident de l'AF447, comme étant une nouvelle étape vers une compréhension totale de la succession d'événements qui ont conduit à ce tragique accident", explique l'avionneur dans un communiqué.

As more detail of Air France flight 447's surreal last four-and-a-half minutes emerges in the latest interim factual report by the French investigation agency (BEA), we see yet another example of a crew that lost touch with the aeroplane it was flying.

It's not difficult to see some predisposing reasons: it was 2 a.m. on a moonless night, not the time people are at their sharpest. A BALPA release just out warns people not to rush to judgement and to consider that fatigue may turn out to be a factor.

The BEA itself cites lack of high altitude handling training for the crew, and they were faced with suddenly having to carry out high altitude manual handling because the autopilot and autothrottle tripped out when faced with momentarily unreliable airspeed readings.

But when the autopilot did trip out, the pilot flying immediately said he had control and promptly made a nose-up input on his sidestick that led to a steep climb, even though moments earlier he had briefed the pilot not flying that climbing higher to avoid turbulence was not an option. So he knew the aeroplane was close to its performance limits, yet made an input that caused the aeroplane to go beyond them.

Then when the stall warning sounded the pilots made no verbal acknowlegement of it, nor did they apply stall recovery control inputs.

The BEA confirms that everything the aeroplane did from the moment the problems started was the result of crew control inputs. At any time during the critical period the appropriate control inputs could have resulted in recovery of control.

This blog is littered with pleas for regulators to update pilot training requirements to acknowledge how aeroplanes have changed and so has the pilot's job. There is a consistent pattern now of pilot failings that lead to accidents.

No, it's not "pilot error", it's lack of the skills needed for managing modern aeroplanes, and the reason for the lack of skills is the lack of appropriate training, and the reason for that is the regulators' refusal to modernise the training parameters. The airlines are required to train pilots for 1950s aeroplanes and then to put them in charge of 21st century ones.

French air accident investigators looking into the crash of Air France flight AF447 have identified serious pilot training shortcomings that may have contributed to the loss of the Airbus A330-200 two years ago.

Among the findings are that “the copilots had received no high altitude training for the “Unreliable [indicated air speed]” procedure and manual air craft handling” and also that there is no crew resource management “for a crew made up of two copilots in a situation with a relief captain.”

In the case of AF447, the pilot was resting when the sequence of events began that led to the crash of the aircraft on June 1, 2009, killing all 238 persons onboard. The aircraft was flying from Rio de Janeiro to Paris.

The report also raises questions about how the pilots flying the aircraft at the time interacted. “No standard callouts regarding the differences in pitch attitude and vertical speed were made,” the report says. What is more, the report states that “neither of the pilots made any reference to the stall warning” and that “neither of the pilots formally identified the stall situation.”

In the first 90 seconds of the sequence of events, the captain was resting outside of the cockpit and returned after having been called back in by the pilot non flying (PNF). The pilot-flying was the least experienced of the three.

Based on the latest interim report, BEA issued ten safety recommendations. In its view, the regulatory authorities should re-examine the content of training and check programs and make mandatory “regular specific exercices aimed at manual airplane handling.” That training should include approach to and recovery from stalls at high altitude.

BEA also believes that authorities should better define the role of the relief captain to ensure that task-sharing of two co-pilots on the flight deck is more clearly set. Pilots also should have access to an angle-of-attack indicator in the cockpit, BEA recommends.

The authority proposes introducing cameras in the cockpit that film the entire instrument panel. It also says that such recording should only be used under strictly defined rules.

Data should be transmitted to an airline’s operations control center to make it easier to localise an aircraft in the event of an emergency. BEA also says authorities should study making mandatory an Emergency Locator Transmitter (ELT) that would become active in such case.

A final report is expected next year. The third interim report, published July 29, highlights again that the aircraft stalled at high altitude and the pilots never performed the nose down inputs to recover. Normal speed readings came back on both instruments after 29 and 54 seconds respectively. At that time, the aircraft was at 38,000 ft. at a displayed speed of 185 knots. In that moment, the aircraft was not stalled and could have been fully recovered by returning to its initial cruise altitude of 35,000 ft. and with power being reduced. The pilot-flying however continued to pull back on the stick, with speed rapidly decreasing. He was not corrected by his two colleagues.

Throughout the descent, the crew maintained a nose-up attitude of the airliner. In fact, the pilot-flying made nose-up inputs and set thrust to takeoff/go around. The BEA notes that “in less than one minute after the disconnection of the autopilot, the airplane was outside its flight envelope following the manual inputs that were mainly nose-up.”

There was no indication of engine malfunction, with the report noting flight control surfaces matched inputs.

Air France, however, said in a statement that “at this stage, there is no reason to question the crew’s technical skills.” The airline adds that “it is important to understand whether the technical environment, systems and alarms hindered the crew’s understanding of the situation.” In Air France’s view, the pilots showed “an unfailing professional attitude, remaining committed to their task to the very end.”

jullienaline a écrit:

Je n'ai pas non plus de colère envers ces hommes formant l'équipage, ils ont fait du mieux qu'ils pouvaient, je n'en ai aucun doute et ils ont tout mon respect. Au regard de la démocratisation et du développement du transport, le métier de pilote a une certaine tendance à se "banaliser". Alors d'ici à trouver des Chuck Yeager à mettre dans chaque cockpit...

Amitiés

Vector a écrit:Bonsoir ou plutôt bonne nuit,
Nous avons déjà eu 125 pages de discussion à ce sujet sur Aéroweb et je ne vais pas tout reprendre.
Le point de vue que je maintiens est que l'ergonomie Airbus n'a pas pour effet de faciliter la tâche des pilotes, mais plutôt de les déresponsabiliser en les isolant de leur avion, et même l'un de l'autre (à cause de la non coordination des mini-manches). Comme on le voit dans le rapport d'étape du BEA, ils ont travaillé l'un contre l'autre à un certain moment, sans le savoir, et comme le résultat est une somme algébrique, l'action finale a été nulle.
Le fait est que le copilote qui avait les commandes (PF) n'a jamais compris ce qui s'est passé et se croyait jusqu'à la fin en survitesse plutôt qu'en décrochage. On peut critiquer ses actions, cependant le but de l'enquête du BEA n'est pas d'attribuer des responsabilités mais de s'assurer qu'un tel accident ne se reproduise jamais.
Dans l'état actuel des choses, il semble que rien n'empêchera l'accident de se reproduire... si les conditions sont réunies. Plus grave encore, il semble que le BEA a éliminé de son rapport une recommandation à l'AESA de faire modifier l'alarme de décrochage qui a certainement conduit le pilote à se convaincre qu'il ne fallait pas piquer puisque chaque fois qu'il augmentait sa vitesse, l'alarme retentissait à nouveau.
A mon avis, cette façon de procéder, que l'on croyait révolue depuis le départ d'Aslanian, refait surface aujourd'hui pour éviter d'incriminer Airbus et c'est un bien mauvais calcul. C'est malheureusement ainsi que se font les choses au Royaume de l'X (et une bonne partie de ma famille en est).
L'histoire se résume à une constatation simple, ces trois pilotes ont été TROMPÉS par leur avion et ça c'est inacceptable par qui que ce soit.
On en reparlera certainement et pendant longtemps.
En toute amitié
Vector

Admin a écrit:
Moi je pense que cet accident ne se reproduira pas dans un futur proche.
Si j'ai été en colère à la lecture des évènements, j'ai toujours été confiant (naïf ?) dans la capacité de chacun à prendre les dispositions qui s'imposent.